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Abstract:  
Public investment represents a non-negligible fraction of total public expenditures. Yet, 
theoretical studies of the effects of public spending when the economy is stuck in a 
liquidity trap invariably assume that government expenditures are entirely wasteful. In 
this paper, we consider a new-Keynesian economy in which a fraction of government 
spending increases the stock of public capital-which is an external input in the 
production technology-subject to a time-to-build constraint. In this environment, an 
increase in public spending has two conflicting effects on current and expected inflation: 
a positive effect due to higher aggregate demand and a negative effect reflecting future 
declines in real marginal cost. We solve the model analytically both in normal times and 
when the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates binds. We show that under 
relatively short time-to-build delays, the spending multiplier at the ZLB decreases with 
the fraction of public investment in a stimulus plan. Conversely, when several quarters 
are required to build new public capital, this relationship is reversed. In the limiting case 
where a fiscal stimulus is entirely allocated to investment in public infrastructure, the 
spending multiplier at the ZLB is 4 to 5 times larger than in normal times when the time 
to build is 12 quarters. 
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“In a depressed economy, with the government able to borrow at very low interest rates,
we should be increasing public investment.”
Paul Krugman, The New York Times, September 12, 2012
“We can create some room to invest in things that make America stronger, like rebuilding
America’s infrastructure.”
Timothy F. Geithner, The New York Times, December 4, 2012
1 Introduction
One of the most widely debated questions since the onset of the latest global recession has been the
effectiveness of public spending as a tool to stimulate the economy. This effectiveness is commonly
judged by the size the spending multiplier, that is, the dollar change in aggregate output that
results from a dollar increase in public expenditures. From an empirical standpoint, estimates of
the spending multiplier range from roughly 0 to well above 1, depending on the sample period
and the identifying assumptions.1 Most theoretical models, on the other hand, yield a spending
multiplier in the neighborhood of 1.2 The main assumption underlying the latter prediction, one
that is also implicit in the empirical literature, is that the economy is in “normal times”.
Recent theoretical research by Eggertsson (2011), Woodford (2011) and Christiano et al. (2011),
however, shows that during sharp recessions that drive nominal interest rates down to their lower
bound of zero—rendering conventional monetary policy useless—an increase in public spending can
be very effective in stimulating economic activity. In this situation, often referred to as a liquidity
trap, the spending multiplier is 2 to 3 times larger than in normal times, under plausible parameter
values. Intuitively, by raising aggregate demand, government spending does what monetary policy
cannot do: generate inflation. Since the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero, the real interest rate
falls, thus further boosting aggregate demand.
These earlier papers have in common the assumption that public spending is entirely wasteful
and has no direct effect on the marginal productivity of private inputs. More specifically, they
abstract from public investment despite the fact that it represents a non-negligible fraction of
total public spending, averaging roughly 23 percent in the U.S. for example. More importantly,
1See, for example, Ramey & Shapiro (1998), Ramey (2011), Fatás & Mihov (2001), Blanchard & Perotti (2002),
Perotti (2005), Galí et al. (2007), Mountford & Uhlig (2009), Barro & Redlick (2011), Auerbach & Gorodnichenko
(2012) and Bouakez et al. (2013) among others.
2See Perotti (2008) and Hall (2009) for comprehensive surveys of the theoretical literature.
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Bachmann & Sims (2012) show that, conditional on a positive government spending shock, the
ratio of public investment to public consumption tends to rise more during recessions than during
expansions. According to the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, of the $550 billion of
planned public spending, roughly $159 billion (that is, 28.9 percent) was set to go into infrastructure.
The popular argument in favor of public investment is that it allows to kill two birds with one
stone: stimulate aggregate demand in the short run while fostering long-run growth with better
infrastructure. While this may be true, the effectiveness of public investment as a fiscal stimulus
nonetheless depends on the way in which it affects expected inflation. To the extent that public
capital is productive, an increase in public investment will have two opposite effects on future real
marginal costs: (i) a negative (supply-side) effect reflecting the expected increase in the marginal
productivity of private inputs, and (ii) a positive effect stemming from the increase in future
aggregate demand due to the increase in households’ expected wealth. Expected inflation, and
thus the output effect of public investment, will depend on the relative importance of these two
forces at different time horizons.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the size of the spending multiplier in a model with
public capital, both in normal times and when the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates
binds. We present an analytically tractable new-Keynesian model in which a fraction of government
spending is in the form of public investment. The latter increases the stock of public capital, which
is an external input in the production technology. In order to account for the implementation
delays associated with the completion of investment projects, we assume that multiple periods are
required to build new productive (public) capital.3 Monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate
according to a Taylor-type rule subject to a non-negativity constraint. As in Woodford (2011),
Eggertsson (2011), and Christiano et al. (2011), we assume that states of the world in which the
ZLB binds are the result of a large negative shock to the discount rate, which increases agents’
desire to save.4
We start by considering a simplified version of our model in which public investment becomes
productive within the period (i.e., without implementation delay), and public capital fully depre-
ciates after one period. Since this version of the model has no (endogenous) state variable, the
spending multiplier can be easily characterized. We show that, in normal times, the spending
multiplier increases linearly with the fraction of public investment in a stimulus plan, whereas the
3The assumption of time to build was first introduced by Kydland & Prescott (1982) in the context of a real
business cycle model.
4Alternatively, Mertens & Ravn (2010) assume that the economy is plunged in a liquidity trap as a result of a
sudden change in agents’ beliefs that is not motivated by fundamentals.
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opposite result holds when the ZLB binds. Intuitively, when there is no accumulation of public
capital, an increase in public spending has only contemporaneous effects on real marginal cost:
a positive effect due to the direct increase in aggregate demand and a negative effect due to the
externality associated with the productive component of the stimulus. The larger this component,
the lower current and expected inflation. In normal times, this translates into a smaller response
of the nominal and real interest rates and thus a larger output response. When the ZLB binds, on
the other hand, this implies a larger response of the real interest rate. Quantitatively, when the
fraction of public investment in a stimulus plan exceeds 35 percent, the spending multiplier exceeds
1 in normal times and is negative when the ZLB binds.
We then consider the more general case with time-to-build and an empirically plausible de-
preciation rate of public capital. We show that the relationship between the size of the spending
multiplier and the fraction of investment spending in a stimulus plan crucially depends on the
length of time to build. In normal times, the multiplier is an increasing (decreasing) function of the
fraction of public investment when the time to build is relatively short (long). In all cases, however,
the multiplier remains close to 1, as is the case in a model with exclusively unproductive public
spending. When the ZLB binds, the spending multiplier becomes a decreasing (increasing) function
of the fraction of public investment when the implementation delay is relatively short (long). In
the limiting case where a fiscal stimulus is entirely allocated to public investment in infrastructure,
the spending multiplier at the ZLB is 4 to 5 times larger than in normal times when the time to
build is 12 quarters.
The intuition for these results is the following. When more than one period is required for
public capital to become productive, the increase in public investment raises the stock of capital
in subsequent periods thus giving rise to the aforementioned supply- and demand-side effects on
future real marginal costs. The demand-side effect tends to amplify the response of inflation at short
horizons to an extent that depends positively on the share of public investment in the stimulus,
whereas the supply-side effect tends to dampen the response of inflation at longer horizons, also
to an extent that increases with the productive component of the stimulus. When the time to
build is short, the supply-side effect quickly comes into play so that expected inflation is mainly
driven by future declines in real marginal cost. In normal times, this leads to a smaller decline
in the long-term ex ante real interest rate, and therefore to a larger consumption response, as the
fraction of public investment becomes larger. As the implementation lag increases, the supply-
side effect of productive public spending is further delayed and the dynamic response of inflation
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becomes increasingly driven by current and futures increases in aggregate demand. In response to
the increase in public sending, inflation thus rises more sharply and more persistently the larger is
the fraction of public investment. This in turn translates into a larger response of the long-term-
real interest rate and thus a smaller response of consumption. When the ZLB binds, the nominal
interest rate cannot adjust, so that the real interest rate moves in opposite direction to expected
inflation. The effects described above are therefore reversed.
In addition to the literature cited above, this paper is closely related to those by Baxter &
King (1993), Linnemann & Schabert (2006), and Leeper et al. (2010), who study the business-cycle
implications of public investment in the context of general-equilibrium models. Baxter & King
(1993) and Leeper et al. (2010) consider a neoclassical framework, whereas Linnemann & Schabert
(2006) consider a model with nominal rigidities. Of all the three papers, only that by Leeper et al.
(2010) allows for a time-to-build technology for the production of public capital.5 Unlike our paper,
however, none of these earlier studies treats the case of a binding ZLB.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section 3
derives the spending multiplier in a simple version of the model without time to build and with full
depreciation of the stock of public capital. Section 4 studies the spending multiplier in the more
general case. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy
We consider a new-Keynesian economy with infinitely lived households, firms, a government, and
a monetary authority. The key feature of the model is that a fraction of government spending
is invested in public capital subject to a time-to-build requirement. The stock of public capital
enters as an external input in the production of intermediate goods, which are used to produce an
homogenous final good. The latter is used for consumption and investment purposes. Intermediate-
good producers are monopolistically competitive and set their prices a` la Calvo, whereas final-
good producers are perfectly competitive. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate
according to a Taylor-type rule subject to a non-negativity constraint.
5Baxter & King (1993) assume that only one period is required to build new public capital, whereas Linnemann &
Schabert (2006) assume that public spending is productive only during the period in which it occurs, an assumption
originally introduced by Barro (1990).
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2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households who have the following lifetime
utility function:6
Et
∞∑
s=0
dt+sU (Ct+s, Nt+s) , (1)
where Ct is consumption, Nt denotes hours worked, and dt is a time-varying discount factor defined
by
dt+s =
{
βt+1βt+2...βt+s
1
s ≥ 1
s = 0,
where 0 < βt+s < 1 is known in t+ s− 1 with certainty.
The representative household enters period t with Bt−1 units of one-period riskless nominal
bonds. During the period, it receives a wage payment, WtNt, and dividends, Dt, from the monop-
olistically competitive firms. This income is used to pay a lump-sum tax, Tt, to the government, to
consumption, and to the purchase of new bonds. The household’s budget constraint is therefore
PtCt + Tt + Bt1 + it ≤ WtNt +Dt + Bt−1, (2)
where Pt is the price of the final good, Wt is nominal wage rate, and 11+it is the price of a nominal
bond purchased at time t, it being the nominal interest rate. The household maximizes (1) subject
to (2) and to no-Ponzi-game condition. The first order conditions for this problem are given by
Wt = −UN (Ct, Nt)
UC (Ct, Nt)
, (3)
1
1 + it
= βt+1Et
(
UC (Ct+1, Nt+1)
UC (Ct, Nt)
Pt
Pt+1
)
, (4)
whereWt = WtPt is the real wage rate and UX (Ct, Nt) = ∂U (Ct, Nt) /∂Xt. Note that the conditional-
expectation operator, Et, is not applied to βt+1 because the latter is known in period t.
2.2 Firms
The final good is produced by perfectly competitive firms using the following constant-elasticity-
of-substitution technology:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Xt(z)1−1/θdz
] θ
θ−1
, (5)
6The equilibrium dynamics of this economy are identical to those of an economy in which public spending affects
preferences in an additively separable manner (as in Christiano et al. (2011)). Since the focus of this paper is not on
the normative implications of fiscal policy, we simply assume that public spending does not enter the utility function.
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where Yt(z) is the quantity of intermediate good z and θ ≥ 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods. Denoting by Pt (z) the price of intermediate good z, demand for z is given by
Xt (z) =
(
Pt (z)
Pt
)−θ
Yt. (6)
Firms in the intermediate-good sector are monopolistically competitive, each producing a differen-
tiated good using labor as a direct input and public capital as an external input
Xt (z) = F (Nt (z) ,Kt) = J (Nt (z))H(Kt) , (7)
where the function J(.) is such that J(UtVt) = J(Ut)J(Vt). Intermediate-good producers set their
prices a` la Calvo. That is, in each period, a given firm resets its price with probability 1 − φ.
Denoting by P ot the optimal price chosen in period t, the firm’s problem is
max
P ot
Et
∞∑
s=0
φsQt,t+s {P ot Xt,t+s − (1− τ)Wt+sNt,t+s} ,
subject to
Xt,t+s = F (Nt,t+s,Kt+s) ,
and
Xt,t+s =
(
P ot
Pt+s
)−θ
Yt+s,
where Qt,t+s = dt+sUC (Ct+s, Nt+s) /dtUC (Ct, Nt) is the stochastic discount factor; Xt,t+s and
Nt,t+s are, respectively, the quantity of intermediate good produced and labor demand in period
t+s if the price set at time t is still in effect; and τ = 1/θ is a subsidy that corrects the steady-state
distortion stemming from monopolistic competition.
The first order condition for this program is given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
φsQt,t+sXt,t+s[P ot − µMCt,t+s] = 0, (8)
where MCt,t+s = (1−τ)Wt+sFN (Nt,t+s,Kt+s) is the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output in
period t+ s if the price set at time t is still in effect, and µ = θ/ (θ − 1) is the desired steady-state
markup over marginal cost.
Given the price setting mechanism just described, the price of the final good evolves according
to
P 1−θt = (1− φ)(P ot )1−θ + φP 1−θt−1 . (9)
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2.3 Fiscal and monetary authorities
The government levies lump-sum taxes to finance its expenditures and the subsidy given to firms
in the intermediate-good sector. Its budget constraint is given by
PtGt + (1− τ)WtNt = Tt, (10)
where Gt is government spending, which composed of two parts, public consumption and public
investment
Gt = Gct +Git. (11)
Public investment increases the stock of public capital according to the following accumulation
equation:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Git−T , (12)
where T ≥ 0. This specification allows for the possibility that several periods may be required
to build new productive capital, i.e., time to build (see Kydland & Prescott (1982)). This feature
reflects the implementation delays typically associated with the different stages of public investment
projects (planning, bidding, contracting, construction, etc.).7
In normal times, public spending is determined by the following process:
Gt = (1− ρ)G+ ρGt−1 + t, (13)
where 0 ≤ ρ < 1, G is the steady-state level of public spending, and t is a zero-mean serially
uncorrelated disturbance. The dynamics of public spending when the economy is plunged in a
liquidity trap will be described in Section 3.2. Moreover, we assume that public investment is
determined by the following policy rule:
Git = Gi + α (Gt −G) , (14)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and Gi is the steady-state level of public investment. The policy parameter
α measures the fraction of public investment in a spending-based stimulus plan. Note that this
fraction need not be equal to the steady-state share of public investment in total public expenditures.
The monetary policy is described by a simple Taylor-type rule subject to a non-negativity
7In general, the outlays of an investment project occur gradually over time after the budget has been authorized.
To keep the model analytically tractable, however, we abstract from this issue and simply assume that investment
expenditures are outlaid in full at the time of the authorization.
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constraint on the nominal interest rate
it = max
(
0; ln β−1 + φpi ln Πt
)
, (15)
where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate between t− 1 and t.
2.4 Market clearing and equilibrium
Market clearing for each intermediate good z requires that
F (Nt (z) ,Kt) = J(Nt (z))H(Kt) =
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−θ
Yt,
which implies
Nt(z) = J−1
[
Yt
H(Kt)
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−θ]
.
Aggregating across all intermediate-good producers and imposing labor market equilibrium, we
obtain
Nt = J−1
(
Yt
H(Kt)
)∫
J−1
[(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−θ]
dz.
This yields
Yt =
F (Nt,Kt)
∆t
,
where ∆t = J
(∫
J−1
[(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−θ]
dz
)
is a measure of dispersion of relative prices, which will be
equal to zero up to a first order approximation of the model around a symmetric steady state.
Since households are identical, the net supply of bonds must be zero in equilibrium (Bt = 0).
Finally, the resource constraint is
Yt = Ct +Gt. (16)
A competitive intertemporal equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices {Pt(z), Pt,Wt, it}∞t=0
and quantities {Xt(z), Nt(z), Nt, Yt, Ct,Kt, Git−T }∞t=0 such that, for a given sequence of exogenous
variables {βt, Gt}∞t=0, households and firms solve their respective optimization problems, the accu-
mulation equation of public capital holds, the spending and monetary rules hold, and all markets
clear. The model equations are listed in Appendix A.1.
2.5 Log-linearized model
The model is solved by log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a deterministic zero-
inflation steady state. In what follows, variables without a time subscript denote steady-state values
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and variables in lowercase denote percentage deviations from steady state (zt = (Zt − Z) /Z), except
for gt = (Gt −G) /Y and git =
(
Git −Gi
)
/Y. Defining rβ,t = − ln(βt), g¯ = G/Y and α¯ = Gi/G, the
log-linearized model is given by (see Appendix A.3 for details)
ct = Etct+1 − Φr (it − Etpit+1 − iβ,t) + Φg (gt − Etgt+1)− Φk (kt − Etkt+1) , (17)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ (Θcct + Θggt −Θkkt) , (18)
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + δ˜gt−T , (19)
it = max (0; rβ,t + φpipit) , (20)
where
Φr =
− UCUCCC
1 + (1− g¯) UCNNUCCC FFNN
Φg =
F
FNN
UCNN
UC
Φr, Φk =
FKK
F
Φg,
Θc =
(
UCNC
UN
− UCCC
UC
)
+ (1− g¯) Θg,
Θg =
(
UNNN
UN
− UCNN
UC
− FNNN
FN
)
F
FNN
, Θk =
FNKK
FN
+ FKK
F
Θg,
and
κ = (1− φ)(1− βφ)
φ
−FNNNFN
−FNNNFN + θ
(
1 + FNNNFN
) > 0,
δ˜ = αδ
α¯g¯
≥ 0.
Model (17)–(20) nests the special case considered by Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011)
and Woodford (2011), where public spending plays no productive role. This case can be recovered
either by assuming that FK = 0 (which implies that Φk = Θk = 0) or by setting α = 0 (which
implies that δ˜ = 0). In the former case, public spending has a zero marginal productivity and thus
does not effect the marginal productivity of private inputs. In the latter, the fraction of total public
spending devoted to investment is nil, implying that the stock of public capital remains constant
at its steady-state level.
3 A Special Case
Consider the case where (i) public investment increases public capital contemporaneously, i.e., with
no time-to-build (T = 0), (ii) public capital depreciates fully at the end of each period (δ = 1), and
(iii) the utility function is additively separable in consumption and leisure (UCN = 0). The first two
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conditions imply that the model has no (endogenous) state variable. The third condition implies
that Φg = Φk = 0 and that Φr, Θc,Θg, and Θk are all positive. In this case, model (17)–(20)
collapses to
ct = Etct+1 − Φr (it − Etpit+1 − iβ,t) , (21)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ
(
Θcct + (Θg − δ˜Θk)gt
)
, (22)
it = max (0; rβ + φpipit) . (23)
This version of the model will allow us to obtain a tractable analytical characterization of the effects
of government spending in normal times and when the ZLB binds.
3.1 The spending multiplier in normal times
In normal times, the nominal interest rate is strictly positive and is determined by
it = rβ + φpipit.
For simplicity, we also assume that the discount factor is constant (i.e., rβ,t = rβ). Under these
assumptions, system (21)–(23) becomes
ct = Etct+1 − Φr (φpipit − Etpit+1) , (24)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ
(
Θcct + (Θg − δ˜Θk)gt
)
. (25)
Under the assumption that φpi > 1, and given the process (13), the unique linear rational expecta-
tion solution of the system above is given by
ct = ϑggt, (26)
pit = ζggt, (27)
where
ϑg = − κ (φpi − ρ) (Θg − δ˜Θk)Φr(1− ρ) (1− βρ) + κ (φpi − ρ) ΦrΘc ,
ζg =
κ (1− ρ) (Θg − δ˜Θk)
(1− ρ) (1− βρ) + κ (φpi − ρ) ΦrΘc .
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Using the log-linearized resource constraint, yt = (1− g¯) ct + gt, we obtain the following expression
for the spending multiplier, m ≡ dYt/dGt = yt/gt:
m = 1 + (1− g)ϑg.
With little algebra, and using the fact that Θc = Φ−1r + (1− g¯) Θg when UCN = 0, the multiplier
can be rewritten as
m = 1 + ψ + (1− g¯) Φr δ˜Θk1 + ψ + (1− g¯) ΦrΘg , (28)
where ψ = (1−ρ)(1−βρ)κ(φpi−ρ) ≥ 0 is a parameter that captures the Keynesian features of this economy,
i.e., nominal rigidity and monetary policy.
Denote by mn the neoclassical multiplier, that is, the multiplier obtained under fully flexible
prices (κ→∞ or, equivalently, ψ = 0), and by mu the multiplier corresponding to the case where
all public spending is unproductive (δ˜Θk = 0). These quantities are given by
mn = 1 + (1− g¯) Φr δ˜Θk1 + (1− g¯) ΦrΘg , (29)
mu =
1 + ψ
1 + ψ + (1− g¯) ΦrΘg . (30)
The following proposition summarizes the main properties of the spending multiplier in normal
times.
Proposition 1 In normal times, the spending multiplier, m, is linearly increasing in the share of
public investment, α, and is larger than 1 if and only if
δ˜Θk ≥ Θg.
In this case, we have
mu ≤ 1 ≤ m ≤ mn.
In order to get some intuition for the results stated in Proposition 1, it is useful to use equations
(26), (27), and the fact that Etgt+1 = ρgt, to express Etpit+1 and Etct+1 as functions of pit and ct
Etct+1 = ρct,
Etpit+1 = ρpit.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the equilibrium in normal times and when the ZLB binds in
a model with no time-to-build and full depreciation of public capital.
Inserting these expressions in (24) and (25), we obtain
ct = −(φpi − ρ)Φr1− ρ pit, (31)
pit =
κΘc
1− βρct +
κ(Θg − δ˜Θk)
1− βρ gt. (32)
The upper panels of Figure 1 provide a graphical representation of these two equations in the (ct, pit)
plan. The curve labeled “Euler” corresponds to (31) and is downward sloping. The curve labeled
“NKPC” corresponds to (32) and its positive slope implies a finite value of κ.
An increase in government spending leaves the Euler curve unchanged but shifts the NKPC.
In the standard case where public spending is entirely unproductive, an increase in government
expenditures raises aggregate demand, which in turn raises real marginal cost by a factor of Θg
(see equation 25). As a result, the NKPC shifts to the left, leading to an increase in inflation
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and a fall in consumption in equilibrium. This in turn yields a multiplier that is smaller than
1. Productive public spending, on the other hand, acts like a technology shock, raising aggregate
supply and lowering real marginal cost by a factor of δ˜Θk. When δ˜Θk < Θg, the latter effect is
not strong enough to induce a fall in real marginal cost and the NKPC still shifts to the left. In
contrast, when δ˜Θk > Θg, the supply-side effect dominates and, as a result, the NKPC shifts to
the right. This yields an increase in consumption and a multiplier larger than 1. The magnitude
of the rightward shift in the NKPC depends positively on the term δ˜Θk − Θg, which increases
monotonically with α. Moreover, as prices become less rigid (that is, as κ increases), the NKPC
becomes steeper and shifts by a larger amount, thus implying a larger multiplier. The latter reaches
its maximum value, mn, when prices are fully flexible, i.e., when the slope of the NKPC is infinite.
3.2 The spending multiplier in a liquidity trap
We now study the effects of a government spending shock under the assumption that the ZLB on
the nominal interest rate binds. The ZLB becomes binding as a result of shock that raises the
discount from β to βl. As in Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011),
we assume that the discount factor can take only two possible values, β and βl < β, and evolves
according to the following process:
Pr
[
βt+1 = βl|βt = βl
]
= p,
Pr
[
βt+1 = βl|βt = β
]
= 0. (33)
For simplicity, we also follow this literature by assuming that gt = glt as long as the ZLB is binding
and gt = 0 otherwise. Substituting it = 0 in equation (17) and denoting by a superscript l the
values taken by the variables when the economy is in a liquidity trap, we obtain the following
system:
clt = Etct+1 + Φr(Etpit+1 + rlβ), (34)
pilt = βEtpit+1 + κ
(
Θcclt + (Θg − δ˜Θk)glt
)
. (35)
The absence of an endogenous state variable in this system means that whenever the economy leaves
the ZLB state, it jumps immediately to its steady state. Thus, Etct+1 = pclt and Etpit+1 = ppilt.
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Solving for clt and pilt yields
clt =
pκ(Θg − δ˜Θk)Φr
(1− p) (1− βp)− pκΦrΘc g
l
t +
κ (1− βp) Φr
(1− p) (1− βp)− pκΦrΘc r
l
β,
pilt =
κ (1− p) (Θg − δ˜Θk)
(1− p) (1− βp)− pκΦrΘc g
l
t +
κΦrΘc
(1− p) (1− βp)− pκΦrΘc r
l
β,
where (1− p) (1− βp) − pκΦrΘc > 0 is a necessary condition for stability. If this condition is
violated, the ZLB does not bind.
The spending multiplier associated with the ZLB state, ml, is given by
ml = ψ
l − 1− (1− g) Φr δ˜Θk
ψl − 1− (1− g¯) ΦrΘg , (36)
where ψl = (1−p)(1−βp)pκ > 0.8 In the case where public spending is entirely unproductive (δ˜Θk = 0),
the multiplier, denoted by mlu, is given by
mlu =
ψl − 1
ψl − 1− (1− g¯) ΦrΘg . (37)
The following proposition summarizes the main properties of the multiplier in a liquidity trap.
Proposition 2 When the ZLB binds, the spending multiplier, ml, is linearly decreasing in the
share of public investment, α, and is larger than 1 if and only if
δ˜Θk ≤ Θg.
In this case, we have
mn < m ≤ 1 ≤ ml ≤ mlu,
Again, the intuition for these results can be understood by examining how the Euler and NKPC
equations are affected by the increase in public spending. Substituting the conditional expectations
of ct+1 and pit+1 in (34) and in (35), we obtain
clt =
pΦr
1− ppi
l
t, (38)
pilt =
κΘc
1− βpc
l
t +
κ(Θg − δ˜Θk)
1− βp g
l
t. (39)
These two curves are represented graphically in the bottom panels of Figure 1, and are labeled Euler l
and NKPC l, respectively. Note that the former is upward sloping when the ZLB binds. Intuitively,
8Note that the stability condition stated above implies that ψl > 1 + (1− g¯) ΦrΘg.
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higher current inflation leads to a rise in expected inflation and since the nominal interest rate is
constant (at zero), the real interest rate must fall, thus causing an increase in consumption, ceteris
paribus. In this case, an increase in public spending will raise consumption in equilibrium only to
the extent that it shifts NKPC l to the left, which requires that the demand-side effect of public
spending dominates its supply-side effect, i.e., Θg ≥ δ˜Θk (see the bottom left panel of Figure 1).
The largest increase in consumption—and therefore the largest multiplier—is obtained when the
fraction of public investment, α, is nil. On the other hand, the larger this fraction, the further
NKPC l shifts to the right and the smaller the value of the multiplier.
3.3 Quantitative analysis
So far, the discussion about the size of the spending multiplier has remained mostly qualitative.
The purpose of this section is to provide a quantitative assessment of the size of the spending
multiplier and its dependence on the share of public investment in a stimulus plan, both in normal
times and when the ZLB binds. To this end, we need to specify functional forms for the utility and
production functions and to assign values to the model parameters. For ease of comparison with
the results obtained by Christiano et al. (2011), we adopt the same functional form for preferences
and consider a production function that nests their specification.
The utility function is given by
U (Ct, Nt) =
(
Cγt (1−Nt)1−γ
)1−σ − 1
1− σ if σ 6= 1
= γ lnCt + (1− γ) ln(1−Nt) if σ = 1,
(40)
where σ > 0 and 0 < γ ≤ 1.
The production function is given by
F (Nt,Kt) = Nat Kbt , (41)
where 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1. This specification nests the linear technology assumed by Christiano et al.
(2011) as a special case in which a = 1 and b = 0. The expressions of the composite parameters Φr,
Φg, Φk, Θg, Θk, and Θc implied by the functional forms assumed above are summarized in Table
1 (see Appendix A.4 for the derivation).
We closely follow Christiano et al. (2011)’s calibration. In particular, we use their values for
β, γ, a, κ, φpi, and ρ, as well as for the steady-state ratio of government spending to output, g¯.
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Table 1: Expressions of the composite parameters
Φr Φg Φk Θc Θg Θk
1 γ(σ−1)1−g¯
bγ(σ−1)
1−g¯
κ
1−γ
κ
1−g¯
γ
1−γ bκ
(
1 + 11−g¯
γ
1−γ
)
However, we set σ = 1 to ensure that UCN (.) = 0, as assumed in the simple case discussed above.9
We also need to assign values to two additional parameters that are absent from Christiano et al.
(2011)’s model: the steady-state share of public investment in total public spending, α¯, and the
elasticity of output with respect to public capital, b. The former can be approximated by the
historical average ratio of public investment to total public spending, which is roughly 0.23 in the
US (from 1947 to 2012), so we set α¯ = 0.23. The latter is less straightforward to parameterize
as available empirical estimates of b vary considerably depending on the methodology and sample
period considered. Using a meta-analysis of existing empirical studies, Bom & Ligthart (2013)
reach an average estimate of 0.08. This value lies in between the two values considered by Leeper
et al. (2010): 0.05 and 1. Therefore, we set b = 0.08 in our benchmark calibration. The chosen
parameter values are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Benchmark parameter values
Discount factor β = 0.99
Preference parameter σ = 1
Preference parameter γ = 0.29
Elasticity of output w.r.t labor a = 1
Elasticity of output w.r.t public capital b = 0.08
Elasticity of inflation w.r.t real marginal cost κ = 0.03
Inflation feedback parameter φpi = 1.5
Autocorrelation of the public spending shock ρ = 0.8
Steady-state ratio of public spending to output g¯ = 0.2
Steady-state ratio of public investment to total public spending α¯ = 0.23
Using the values reported in Table 2, we compute the spending multiplier as a function of α in
normal times (m) and when the ZLB binds (ml). The results are shown in Figure 2. The figure also
reports the neoclassical multiplier, mn, defined in (29). Figure 2 confirms that, in normal times, the
spending multiplier in the new-Keynesian model increases linearly with α, from 0.88 when α = 0
9Christiano et al. (2011) set σ = 2 in their benchmark calibration. See Bilbiie (2011) and Monacelli & Perotti
(2008) for an analysis of the effects of public spending under the assumption of non-separability between consumption
and leisure.
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to 1.5 when α = 1. When the ZLB binds, on the other hand, the multiplier declines linearly from
2.26 when α = 0 to −4.2 when α = 1. When α exceeds 35 percent, the spending multiplier exceeds
1 in normal times and is negative when the ZLB binds. Interestingly, the value of α for which
m = ml = mn = 1 is equal to 19.4 percent,10 which is even lower than the steady-state share of
public investment in total public expenditures (α¯). This suggests that the supply-side effects of
public spending can be substantial even with a modest fraction of productive public spending when
the latter affects production contemporaneously.
Figure 2: Spending multiplier as a function of the share of public investment in a model with no
time-to-build and full depreciation of public capital.
It is important to emphasize that the assumption of additive separability is only made for
analytical tractability and is not essential for the results outlined so far. With σ = 2, we obtain
very similar patterns for m, ml and mn to those depicted in Figure 2. Of course, the numerical
10This is the value of α such that the aggregate supply and aggregate demand effects of public spending exactly
offset each other (Θg = δ˜Θk), leaving and private spending and inflation unchanged.
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values of the multiplier will be slightly different,11 but the general message remains.12
4 The Spending Multiplier in a Model with Public Investment
and Time to Build
The simplifying assumptions considered in the previous section, namely that public investment
becomes immediately productive and public capital fully depreciates after one period, albeit un-
realistic, are nonetheless insightful about the role of investment in this economy. Under these
assumptions, the supply-side effect of public spending is largest on impact (i.e., at the time of the
shock), thus implying that the spending multiplier at the ZLB may become small and even negative
when the fraction of public investment in a stimulus plan is sufficiently large.
In this section, we relax these two assumptions and consider a more general version of the model
with time to build (T ≥ 1) and an empirically plausible value of the depreciation rate of public
capital, δ. As we did in section 3, we first study the effects of public capital in normal times before
turning to those occurring when the ZLB binds.
4.1 The spending multiplier in normal times
In normal times, the model is given by equation (17)–(20), with it = φpipit. Under the assumption
that φpi > 1, and given the process (13), the unique linear rational expectation solution of the
system above is given by
ct = ϑkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=0
ϑτggt−τ , (42)
pit = ζkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=0
ζτg gt−τ , (43)
where the coefficients ϑk, ζk, ϑτg , and ζτg (τ = 0, ..., T ) are given in Appendix A.5.1 . The impact
multiplier, m0, is then given by
m0 = 1 + (1− g¯)ϑ0g.
In order to study the way in which m0 varies with the share of public investment, α, it is easier
to consider again the case with additively separable preferences (UCN (.) = 0). Figure 3 shows
this relationship for different time-to-build delays, T, ranging from 1 to 12 quarters. The reported
11In particular, the values of m and ml obtained when α = 0 (i.e., mu and mlu, respectively) are identical to those
reported by Christiano et al. (2011) (i.e., 1.05 and 3.7, respectively.)
12These results are not reported but are available upon request.
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values for m0 are computed using the parameter values presented in Table 2 and a value of 0.02 for
the depreciation rate of public capital, δ (an in Leeper et al. (2010)). The first message conveyed
by this figure is that the spending multiplier is monotonically increasing in α when the time to
build is relatively short (T ≤ 8 quarters) and monotonically decreasing in α when the time to build
is relatively long.
Figure 3: Spending multiplier as a function of the share of public investment and time-to-build
delay in normal times.
In order to understand the intuition behind this result, it is useful to recall that the size of
the multiplier depends on the response of consumption, which in our sticky-price economy depends
on the deviation of the long-term ex ante real interest rate from its steady-state value, rLTt ≡
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Et
∑∞
τ=0(it+τ − pit+1+τ − rβ).13 The latter is in turn determined by the entire path of (expected)
inflation and ultimately by the dynamic response of real marginal cost. With T > 0, the increase in
public investment raises the stock of capital in subsequent periods and this has two opposite effects
on future real marginal costs: (i) a negative (supply-side) effect reflecting the expected increase in
the marginal productivity of labor, and (ii) a positive effect stemming from the increase in future
aggregate demand due to the increase in households’ expected wealth. The demand side effect
tends to amplify the response of inflation at short horizons to an extent that depends positively on
the share of public investment in the stimulus, α, whereas the supply side effect tends to dampen
the response of inflation at longer horizons, also to an extent that increases with α. When the
time to build is short, the supply-side effect quickly comes into play so that expected inflation is
mainly driven by future declines in real marginal cost. In this case, the long-term real interest
rate rises less in response to the increase in public spending as α becomes larger. This is why
the consumption response, and therefore the spending multiplier, are increasing in α when T is
sufficiently short. Figure 4 illustrates this mechanism. The figure depicts the impulse responses to
a government spending shock for T = 1 and α = {0, 0.5, 1} . As α increases, inflation, the nominal
and the real interest rates rise more during the first 7 quarters after the shock, but fall more sharply
for a prolonged period of time afterwards. As a result, the rise in the long run-real interest rate
and the fall in consumption are smaller the larger is α.
As T increases, the supply-side effect of productive public spending is further delayed and
the dynamic response of inflation becomes increasingly driven by current and futures increases
in aggregate demand. In response to the shock, the long-term real interest rate thus rises more,
consumption falls more, and the spending multiplier declines as α increases. This is illustrated in
Figure 5, which shows the dynamic effects of the government spending shock for T = 12.
The second observation that emerges from Figure 3 is that the spending multiplier is always
lower than unity. Thus, under plausible parameter values and time-to-build delays, the spending
multiplier in normal times remains numerically close to that predicted by a standard model in
which all public spending is unproductive.
13Iterating equation (21) forward yields
ct = lim
j→∞
Etct+j − ΦrrLTt .
In response to a transitory shock, limj→∞Etct+j = 0 and current consumption moves in an opposite direction to rLTt
(since Φr > 0).
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock in normal times, T = 1.
Note: The nominal and real interest rates are expressed in level form whereas the long-term real
interest rate is expressed as a deviation from its steady-state value.
21
Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a government spending shock in normal times, T = 12.
Note: The nominal and real interest rates are expressed in level form whereas the long-term real
interest rate is expressed as a deviation from its steady-state value.
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4.2 The spending multiplier in a liquidity trap
When the ZLB binds, the model is given by equation (17)–(20), with it = 0. As before, we assume
that the discount factor remains high, at βl, with probability p and returns permanently to its
steady-state value, β, with probability 1− p. We also assume that gt+1 = gt > 0 if the ZLB is still
binding in t + 1 and gt+1 = 0 otherwise. Note that the economy does not immediately return to
steady state when the ZLB ceases to bind, as the stock of public capital continues to adjust and
converges to its steady state only gradually. Conditional on the economy being in the ZLB state,
the expected value of a given variable in t + 1 is an average of its possible values in t + 1 inside
and outside the liquidity trap, weighted by the respective probabilities of being in these two states.
The linear rational expectation solution of the model when the ZLB binds is given by
ct = ϑlirlβ + ϑlkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=0
ϑl,τg gt−τ , (44)
pit = ζ lirlβ + ζ lkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=0
ζ l,τg gt−τ , (45)
where the coefficients ϑlk, ζ lk, ϑl,τg , and ζ l,τg (τ = 0, ..., T ) are given in Appendix A.5.2 . The impact
spending multiplier when the ZLB binds, ml,0, is
ml,0 = 1 + (1− g¯)ϑl,0g .
Focusing again on the case with additively separable preferences (UCN = 0), we compute ml,0
as a function of α and T using the parameter values in Table 2 and δ = 0.02. The results are
depicted in Figure 6. They indicate that the spending multiplier is decreasing in α when the time
to build is shorter than 4 quarters and increasing in α for longer implementation delays. Intuitively,
an increase in government spending initially raises aggregate demand and expected inflation. Since
the nominal interest rate is stuck at zero, this translates into a fall in the real interest rate during
the first few quarters after the shock. When T is sufficiently short, the deflationary (supply-side)
effect associated with the increase in productive public capital comes about quickly after the initial
shock, attenuating the fall in the real interest rate to an extent that depends positively on α. This
in turn means that the long-term real interest rate falls less, thus implying a lower multiplier, as α
increases.
As T increases, the deflationary pressure brought about the increase in public capital is further
delayed, and so is its positive effect on the real interest rate. At the same time, the positive wealth
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Figure 6: Spending multiplier as a function of the share of public investment and time-to-build
delay in a liquidity trap.
effect associated with the expected increase in labor income further reinforces the fall in the real
interest rate at the time of the shock and during the subsequent periods, and this effect is larger
the larger is α. When T is sufficiently long, the net effect is a fall in the long-term real interest
rate that is larger the larger is α. This is why the spending multiplier is increasing in α when the
implementation delay is long.
Figure 6 shows that the spending multiplier can be substantially large at the ZLB when a
large fraction of public spending is invested in public capital and when the implementation delay is
relatively long. When α = 1 and T = 12, the multiplier is roughly 4.5 times larger than in normal
times.
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4.3 Robustness: the case of non-separable preferences
For ease of interpretation, the results presented in Figures 4-6 are generated under the assumption
of additively separable preferences (UCN = 0). In this section, we study the more general case in
which consumption and leisure are substitutes. This is achieved by choosing a strictly positive
value of σ that is different from 1. Figures 7 and 8 (in Appendix A.6 ) show the spending multiplier
as a function of α and T in normal times and when the ZLB binds, respectively, for σ = 2, the
value imposed by Christiano et al. (2011).
The two figures show that the spending multiplier is larger for any given value of α and T than
that obtained under separable preferences. Intuitively, the increase in labor demand triggered by
the increase in public spending reduces leisure and raises the marginal utility of consumption,
ceteris paribus. This channel mitigates the negative wealth effect associated with the increase in
taxes needed to finance the increase in government spending. Thus, consumption falls less and may
even increase in response to the public spending shock when substitutability between consumption
and leisure is sufficiently strong, which is the case when σ = 2. This in turn implies that the shape
of the relationship between the multiplier and α and T is preserved when one considers alternative
values of σ. Under non-separable preferences, the spending multiplier at the ZLB is more than 5
times larger than in normal times when α = 1 and T = 12.
5 Conclusion
The main lesson from the literature on the effects of fiscal policy in a liquidity trap is that policies
that stimulate aggregate demand can have substantially larger effects when the ZLB binds than
in normal times. On the other hand, policies that raise the natural level of output may depress
economic activity even further in a liquidity trap (Eggertsson (2011)). When a fraction of public
spending is invested in infrastructure, and to the extent that public capital raises the marginal
productivity of private inputs, an increase in government spending raises both aggregate demand
and future natural levels of output. This policy affects current and expected inflation in two
conflicting ways, so that the size of the spending multiplier depends on the fraction of public
investment in a stimulus plan and on the implementation delays associated with the completion of
public investment projects.
This paper has shown that, in states where the ZLB binds, the spending multiplier is smaller the
larger the share of public investment in a stimulus plan when the time-to-build delay is relatively
short—less than 4 quarters under our benchmark calibration. In contrast, with sufficiently long
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time-to-build delays, this relationship is reversed and the spending multiplier can be twice as large
as the multiplier associated with unproductive public expenditures. These results suggest that the
conventional wisdom that fiscal stimulus plans should prioritize shovel ready investment projects
may not hold when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap. A formal analysis of the normative
aspects of fiscal policy—including the optimal allocation of public spending—when the ZLB binds,
however, ought to be welfare-based, which requires knowledge of the way in which the different
categories of public spending affect agents’ utility. We leave this task for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Summary of the model
The model equilibrium conditions are
Yt = Ct +Gt, (A.1)
∆tYt = F (Nt,Kt) , (A.2)
1
1 + it
= βt+1Et
(
UC (Ct+1, Nt+1)
UC (Ct, Nt)
Pt
Pt+1
)
, (A.3)
Wt = −UN (Ct, Nt)
UC (Ct, Nt)
, (A.4)
0 = Et
∞∑
s=0
φsQt,t+sXt,t+s (P ot − µMCt,t+s) , (A.5)
P 1−θt = (1− φ)(P ot )1−θ + φP 1−θt−1 , (A.6)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Git−T , (A.7)
it = max
(
0; ln β−1 + φpi ln
Pt
Pt−1
)
, (A.8)
where
∆t = J
(∫
J−1
[(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−θ]
dz
)
Qt,t+s = dt+sUC (Ct+s, Nt+s) /dtUC (Ct, Nt) ,
MCt,t+s =
(1− τ)Wt+s
FN (Nt,t+s,Kt+s)
.
A.2 Steady state
Using equations (A.1) to (A.8) evaluated at steady state, we obtain a system of three equations that
uniquely determine private consumption, hours worked and public capital in steady state. These
quantities are all we need to compute the log-linearized version of the model.
C = (1− g¯)F (N,K) ,
−UN (C, 1−N)
UC (C, 1−N) =
θ − 1
(1− τ) θFN (N,K) ,
K = α¯
δ
g¯
1− g¯ C.
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A.3 The log-linearized model
We log-linearize the model around a deterministic zero-inflation steady state. Variables without a
time subscript denote steady-state values and variables in lowercase denote percentage deviations
from steady state (zt = (Zt − Z) /Z), except for gt = (Gt −G) /Y and git =
(
Git −Gi
)
/Y. Defining
rβ,t = − ln(βt), g¯ = G/Y and α¯ = Gi/G, the log-linearized model is given by
yt = (1− g¯) ct + gt,
nt =
F
FNN
yt − FKK
FNN
kt,
ct = Etct+1 +
UC
UCCC
(it − Etpit+1 − rβ,t)− UCNN
UCCC
(nt − Etnt+1) ,
wt =
(
UCNC
UN
− UCCC
UC
)
ct +
(
UNNN
UN
− UCNN
UC
)
nt,
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ
(
wt − FNNN
FN
nt − FNKK
FN
kt
)
,
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + δ˜gt−T ,
it = max (0; rβ,t + φpipit) ,
where
κ = (1− φ)(1− βφ)
φ
−FNNNFN
−FNNNFN + θ
(
1 + FNNNFN
) > 0,
δ˜ = αδ
α¯g¯
≥ 0,
and where we have used the fact that git = αgt.
A.4 Functional forms and the implied composite parameters
We consider the following production and utility functions:
U (Ct, Nt) =
(
Cγt (1−Nt)1−γ
)1−σ − 1
1− σ if σ 6= 1
= γ lnCt + (1− γ) ln(1−Nt) if σ = 1,
and
F (Nt,Kt) = Nat Kbt .
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These specifications imply the following first and second derivatives:
FN = a
F (N,K)
N
, FK = b
F (N,K)
K
,
UC = γCγ(1−σ)−1 (1−N)(1−γ)(1−σ) ,
UCC = − (1 + γ (σ − 1)) UC
C
,
UCN = (1− γ) (σ − 1) UC1−N ,
UN = −
[
(1− γ)Cγ(1−σ) (1−N)(1−γ)(1−σ)−1
]
,
UNN = −
[
(1 + (1− γ) (σ − 1)) (1− γ)Cγ(1−σ) (1−N)(1−γ)(1−σ)−2
]
.
The steady-state values for C, N, and K are implicitly given by
C = (1− g¯)NaKb,
θ − 1
(1− τ) θ
a
1− g¯ =
1− γ
γ
N
1−N ,
K = α¯
δ
g¯
1− g¯ C.
The composite parameters Φr, Φg, Φk, Θg, Θk, and Θc, are given by
Φr =
1
1− γ (1− σ) + (1− γ) (1− σ) N1−N 1−ga
= 1,
Φg =
1
a
(1− γ) (σ − 1) N1−N Φr =
γ (σ − 1)
1− g¯ ,
Φk = bΦg,
Θg = −κ
a
(
(1− γ) (σ − 1) N1−N + a− 1
)
+ κ
a
(1 + (1− γ) (σ − 1)) (1− γ)Cγ(1−σ) (1−N)(1−γ)(1−σ)−1 N1−N
(1− γ)Cγ(1−σ) (1−N)(1−γ)(1−σ)−1
= κ1− g¯
γ
1− γ ,
Θk = b (κ+ Θg) ,
Θc = κ+ (1− g¯) Θg = κ1− γ .
A.5 Analytical solution of the model with time to build (T ≥ 1)
In this subsection, we explain how we solve the model with time to build both in normal times and
when the ZLB binds. In both cases, we use the method of undetermined coefficients.
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A.5.1 Normal times
Under the assumption that φpi > 1, the unique linear rational expectation solution is given by
ct = ϑkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=0
ϑτggt−τ ,
pit = ζkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=0
ζτg gt−τ .
Substituting these two expressions into equations (17)-(20) (with it = rβ + φpipit).and equating the
relevant coefficients, we obtain
ϑk = (1− δ) κ (φpi − (1− δ)) ΦrΘk − δ (1− β (1− δ)) Φk
δ (1− β (1− δ)) + κ (φpi − (1− δ)) ΦrΘc ,
ζk = − (1− δ) κδ (ΘcΦk + Θk)
δ (1− β (1− δ)) + κ (φpi − (1− δ)) ΦrΘc ,
and (
ϑ0g
ζ0g
)
= δ˜ΛA
(
ϑ1g
ζ1g
)
+
(1− ρβ) [δ˜Φk + (1− ρ) Φg]− κ (φpi − ρ) ΦrΘg
κ (1− ρ) Θg + κ
[
δ˜Φk + (1− ρ) Φg
]
Θc
 ,
(
ϑτg
ζτg
)
= $B
(
ϑτ+1g
ζτ+1g
)
, τ = 1, ..., T − 2; for T > 2,(
ϑT−1g
ζT−1g
)
= $B
(
ϑTg
ζTg
)
+ δ˜$
(
Φk
κΘcΦk
)
, for T > 1,(
ϑTg
ζTg
)
= δ˜$B
(
ϑk
ζk
)
+ δ˜$
(
κφpiΦrΘk − δΦk
κ(Θk + δΘcΦk)
)
, for T ≥ 1,
where
Λ = ((1− ρ) (1− βρ) + κ (φpi − ρ) ΦrΘc)−1 , $ = (1 + κφpiΦrΘc)−1 ,
and
A =
(
1− βρ (1− βφpi) Φr
κΘc κΦrΘc + β (1− ρ)
)
, B =
(
1 (1− βφpi) Φr
κΘc κΦrΘc + β
)
.
In practice, for any arbitrary T , ϑτg , and ζτg (τ = 0, ..., T ) are computed backward recursively: Start
by computing ϑTg and ζTg , which are only functions of the deep parameters. Once ϑTg and ζTg are
known, compute ϑT−1g and ζT−1g , and so on up to ϑ0g and ζ0g .
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A.5.2 Liquidity trap
When the ZLB binds (it = 0), equations (17)-(20) imply
clt = Etct+1 − Φr (−Etpit+1 − iβ,t) + Φg
(
glt − Etgt+1
)
− Φk
(
δkt − δ˜Etgt−(T−1)
)
,
pilt = βEtpit+1 + Θcclt + Θgglt −Θkkt.
The unique linear rational expectation solution is given by
clt = ϑlirlβ + ϑlkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=0
ϑl,τg gt−τ ,
pilt = ζ lirlβ + ζ lkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=0
ζ l,τg gt−τ .
Unlike the simple case discussed in Section 3.2, whenever the ZLB ceases to bind, the economy
does not immediately jump to the steady state, as the stock of public capital continues to adjust.
Thus, the expected value of a given variable in t + 1 is an average of its possible values in t + 1
inside and outside the liquidity trap, weighted by the respective probabilities of being in these two
states. Using the equilibrium paths of consumption and inflation inside and outside the ZLB state,
we obtain
Etct+1 = p
(
ϑlir
l
β + ϑlkkt−1 + ϑl,0g gt +
T∑
τ=1
ϑl,τg gt+1−τ
)
+ (1− p)
(
ϑkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=1
ϑτggt+1−τ
)
,
Etpit+1 = p
(
ζ lir
l
β + ζ lkkt−1 + ζ l,0g gt +
T∑
τ=1
ζ l,τg gt+1−τ
)
+ (1− p)
(
ζkkt−1 +
T∑
τ=1
ζτg gt+1−τ
)
,
where we have used the fact that
gt+1 = gt if the ZLB is still binding in t+ 1,
= 0 otherwise.
Equating the relevant coefficients yields
ϑli =
(1− βp) Φr
(1− p) (1− βp)− pκΦrΘc ,
ζ li =
ΘcΦr
(1− p) (1− βp)− pκΦrΘc ,
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ϑlk =
(1− p) (1− δ) [(1− pβ (1− δ))ϑk + Φrζk]− pκ (1− δ)2 ΦrΘk − (1− δ) (1− pβ (1− δ)) δΦk
(1− p (1− δ)) (1− βp (1− δ))− pκ (1− δ) ΦrΘc ,
ζ lk =
(1− p) (1− δ) {κΘcϑk + [β (1− p (1− δ)) + κΘcΦr] ζk} − κ (1− δ) [(1− pβ (1− δ)) Θk + δΘcΦk]
(1− p (1− δ)) (1− βp (1− δ))− pκ (1− δ) ΦrΘc ,
and (
ϑl,0g
ζ l,0g
)
= δ˜ΛlAl
[
p
(
ϑl,1g
ζ l,1g
)
+ (1− p)
(
ϑ1g
ζ1g
)]
+ Λl
(
(1− pβ) (1− p) Φg + pκΦrΘg
κ (1− p) (Θg + ΦgΘc)
)
,(
ϑl,τg
ζ l,τg
)
= pBl
(
ϑl,τ+1g
ζ l,τ+1g
)
+ (1− p)Bl
(
ϑτ+1g
ζτ+1g
)
, τ = 1, ..., T − 2, for T > 2,(
ϑl,T−1g
ζ l,T−1g
)
= pBl
(
ϑl,Tg
ζ l,Tg
)
+ (1− p)Bl
(
ϑTg
ζTg
)
+
(
δ˜Φk
κδ˜ΘcΦk
)
, for T > 1,(
ϑTg
ζTg
)
= pδ˜Bl
(
ϑlk
ζ lk
)
+ (1− p)δ˜Bl
(
ϑk
ζk
)
−
(
δδ˜Φk
κδ˜(δΘcΦk + Θk)
)
, for T ≥ 1,
where
Λl = ((1− p) (1− βp)− pκΦrΘc)−1 ,
and
Al=
(
1− pβ Φr
κΘc κΦrΘc + β (1− p)
)
, Bl=
(
1 Φr
κΘc κΦrΘc + β
)
.
Again, the coefficients ϑl,τg and ζ l,τg (τ = 0, ..., T ) are computed recursively starting from period T .
A.6 Figures
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Figure 7: Spending multiplier as a function of the share of public investment and time-to-build
delay in normal times, non-separable preferences (σ = 2).
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Figure 8: Spending multiplier as a function of the share of public investment and time-to-build
delay in a liquidity trap, non-separable preferences (σ = 2).
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